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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
judges are no more capable of appraising human motivations than is
the legislature, and because the statute applies equally to all guests, it
does not discriminate invidiously and the court should not invade the
province of the legislature.
The Supreme Court of Iowa in Keasling v. Thompson summarily
dismissed the equal protection arguments against the Iowa guest statute
in finding that "If Silver v. Silver . . .is to be reversed we must ac-
knowledge the Supreme Court's exclusive right to do So.''26 Under the
ruling of Keasling the proper remedy for the injured guest is with the
legislature.
Due to the adoption of the significant relationship rule in Brickner
v. Gooden, Oklahoma residents who are injured guests have a greater
chance of recovery in the Oklahoma courts, but their opportunity to sue
is by no means absolute. A foreign guest statute may yet defeat re-
covery if an Oklahoma court finds that with respect to the particular
issue the foreign state had the most significant relationship to the occur-
rence and the parties. The only solution which will produce uniformity
in this area is for the states which have guest statutes to repeal them
or to follow the direction of the Thompson court and declare them un-
constitutional.
It appears likely that state courts will continue to split in accepting
or rejecting the Thompson rationale. Oklahoma courts can prevent the
unequal consequences of these foreign statutes only by ruling that the
forum state has the most significant relationship to the parties and ap-
plying the law of Oklahoma in all guest litigation.
Kenneth L. Brune
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FoURTH- AMENDMENT PROTECTION
AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES EXTENDED TO
ALIENS ON FOREIGN SOIL. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d
267 (2d Cir. 1974).
A tale of international intrigue involving kidnapping and torture
has resulted in a significant decision by the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit against illegal searches and seizures by
26. - Iowa -, -, 217 N.W.2d 687, 692 (1974).
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agents of the United States in foreign countries.' Francisco Toscanino
alleged that he had been kidnapped in Uruguay, tortured for over two
weeks in Brazil and ultimately brought to the United States where he
was convicted in the Eastern District of New York for conspiracy to
smuggle heroin into the United States.
Without questioning the sufficiency of the evidence or making any
claim of error with respect to the trial itself, Toscanino offered to prove
that he had been abducted and brought under the jurisdiction of the
United States in violation of the laws of Uruguay, Brazil and the United
States. Toscanino, an Italian citizen residing in Uruguay, contended
that he had been lured from his home in Montevideo by a telephone
call from a Uruguayan policeman who had been bribed by American
agents. He was then knocked unconscious with a gun and thrown into
the car of the policeman and driven by a circuitous route to the Brazil-
ian border where he was turned over to Brazilian-American agents.
Once in Brazil, Toscanino claimed to have been tortured and interro-
gated for seventeen days. The methods employed by his captors were
said to have included deprivation of food and sleep, electrical shocks
to sensitive areas of the body, beatings, and injections of harsh chemi-
cals into the nasal and anal passages.
Finally, Toscanino was taken to Rio de Janeiro where he was
drugged and placed on a flight to the United States accompanied by
American agents. He alleged that during the entire period of his or-
deal that the United States Attorney for the Eastern Distriot of New
York (and the prosecutor of his case) received regular reports of the
progress of the interrogation. Toscanino also contended that he had
been the victim of illegal wiretaps prior to his abduction from Uruguay
and that this activity was evidenced by the subsequent arrest in Uruguay
of the telephone company employee who had been bribed by American
agents.
The United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York
neither affirmed nor denied the allegations and the district court denied
Toscanino's motion for an order vacating the verdict and ordering his
return to Uruguay. The lower court relied principally on the United
States Supreme Court decisions of Frisbee v. Collins' and Ker v. Illi-
nois,3 both holding that the illegal abductions which brought the de-
1. 500 F.2d 267 (1974).
2. 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
3. 119 US. 436 (1886).
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fendants within the respective jurisdictions of Michigan and Illinois
were immaterial to the disposition of the cases.
The court of appeals reversed the district court's decision and re-
manded for a hearing in which the government will be required to re-
spond to Toscanino's allegations. Judge Mansfield, writing the major-
ity opinion, acknowledged the Ker-Frisbee rule, but held that subse-
quent decisions by the Supreme Court have undermined it and ex-
panded the interpretation of "due process."
No longer is [due process] limited to the guarantee of fair
procedure at trial. In an effort to deter police misconduct,
the term has been expanded to bar the government from rea-
lizing directly the fruits of its own deliberate and unnecessary
lawlessness in bringing the accused to trial.4
As support for this broadened interpretation of due process, Judge
Mansfield cited Rochin v. California,5 a case decided during the same
term as Frisbee. In Rochin the Court reversed a conviction for nar-
cotics possession obtained after agents, by the forceful induction of an
emetic solution, had caused the defendant to vomit up the morphine
capsules which he had swallowed. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for
the majority, stated that:
Regard for the requirements of the Due Process Clause 'in-
escapably imposes upon this Court an exercise of judgment
upon the whole course of the proceedings in order to ascer-
tain whether they offend those canons of decency and fair-
ness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking
peoples even toward those charged with the most heinous
offenses.' 6
The landmark decision of Mapp v. Ohio,7 wherein the exclusion-
ary rule was held applicable to state prosecutions, provided, in Judge
Mansfield's opinion, further weakening of the Ker-Frisbee doctrine.
That rule, he said, represented a device created by the courts to ".
deter disregard for constitutional prohibitions and give substance to
constitutional rights." s The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has
also expressed similar reservations about the continued validity of Ker-
4. 500 F.2d at 272. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Wong Sun
v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See also
Pitler 'The Fruit of tie Poisonous Tree"- Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CALIF. L. REV.
579, 600 (1968).
5. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
6. Id. at 169.
7. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
8. 500 F.2d at 273.. .
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Frisbee in Government of Virgin Islands v. OrtizO because it "condones
illegal police conduct".' 0
Judge Mansfield was unable to reconcile these subsequent cases
and their expansion of due process which has denied to the government
the fruits of deliberate pretrial illegality with the Ker-Frisbee rule. If
Toscanino's allegations were proven to be true, then only by returning
him to his status quo ante (i.e., returning him to Uruguay) could the
requirements of -the fourth amendment and fundamental fairness be
met. In other words, the majority felt that courts must simply divest
themselves of jurisdiction over defendants whose presence has been se-
cured by illegal conduct.
The existence of an extradition treaty" between the United States
and Uruguay under which Toscanino's surrender may have been legally
effected made the narcotics agents' conduct even more reprehensible
to the court. Judge Mansfield relied upon this treaty to distinguish this
case and United States v. Cotten, 2 wherein the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit adhered to Ker and Frisbee in affirming convictions
of defendants who had been forcibly taken from Viet Nam to stand trial
in the United States. The United States did not have an extradition
treaty with the Republic of Viet Nam and Judge Mansfield disposed
of Cotten by concluding: "Thus the transportation of the appellants to
the United States did not violate international law or an international
treaty."
The most remarkable portion of the majority's opinion, however,
is revealed in the discussion of the allegation of illegal wiretapping of
Toscanino's home in Montevideo. Although agreeing with the govern-
ment that the statute governing wiretapping' 3 had no application in a
foreign country, the court held that an alien on foreign soil was entitled
to the protection of the United States Constitution when he is the victim
of unlawful conduct by United States government agents. Though
necessarily implied from the early portion of the opinion, the court here
expressly held that:
No sound basis is offered in support of a different rule with
respect to aliens who are the victims of unconstitutional ac-
tion abroad, at least where the government seeks to exploit
9. 427 F.2d 1043 (3d Cir. 1970).
10. Id. at 1045 n.2.
11. 35 Stat. 2028 (1908).
12. 471 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1973).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq.
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the fruits of its unlawful conduct in a criminal proceeding
against the alien in the United States. 4
It has long been held that an alien within the jurisdiction of the
United States is entitled to constitutional guarantees, 15 as are Americans
on foreign soil when dealing with the United States government.' 6
Here, however, as was said by Judge Mulligan, who dissented from the
court's refusal to reconsider the case, the original decision ". . . holds,
for ,the first time and without any discernible authority, that the Fourth
Amendment protects a foreign national while residing on alien soil
against 'unlawful searches and seizures.' "17
The court of appeals' holding is conceptually interesting. One
would think that the term "unconstitutional" appears by definition to
be describing a force of some sort (a statute or police action, for ex-
ample) working to deprive a person protected by the Constitution of
some right guaranteed by it. Here, however, the Second Circuit' holds
in effect that one can be acting unconstitutionally toward another who
heretofore had not been entitled to the protection of the Constitution.
Clearly, conduct such as that alleged should be deterred by our
courts by refusing to the government the opportunity to exploit its fruits.
Perhaps, however, the Second Circuit should not have gone so far as
to extend constitutional protection to aliens in foreign countries. Al-
though similar rights for the citizens of the world are to be desired, the
practical effect of such a holding is to make international fugitives im-
mune from prosecution for federal crimes in United States courts unless
United States Constitutional criminal procedure is followed by federal
agents in the country where they are apprehended.' 8 Most would
agree that the procedural safeguards which the American agent could
personally extend to the subject of the investigation should be extended
(e.g., Miranda warning). However, when the legal system of a foreign
country does not afford a method by which American agents can com-
14. 500 F.2d at 280.
15. Au Yi Lau v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, 445 F.2d
217, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971).
16. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
17. Wall Street Journal, Oct. 16, 1974 at 2, col. 1.
18. As Judge Mansfield implied, the "silver platter" doctrine is still in effect with
regard to evidence obtained by foreign officials:
The Constitution, of course, applies only to the conduct abroad of agents acting
on behalf of the United States. It does not govern the independent conduct
of foreign officials in their own country. [Citations omitted]. Whether or not
United States officials are substantially involved, or foreigners are acting as
their agents or employees, is a question of fact to be resolved in each case.
500 F.2d at 280 n.9.
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ply with the more technical procedural requirements of the United
States, then perhaps our courts should be more reluctant to exclude evi-
dence obtained in the foreign country.
Judge Mansfield apparently relied upon the First Circuit decision
of Best v. United States 0 as support for his statement that, "It is no
answer to argue that the foreign country which is the situs of the search
does not afford a procedure for issuance of a warrant."20  The Best
decision, however, indicated only that constitutional rights cannot be
suspended in a foreign country when the United States is governing that
country (in this case, occupied Austria). Thus, even though United
States citizens may not necessarily be assured of all procedural protec-
tions when in a country where no equivalent legal machinery exists,
Judge Mansfield's interpretation of Best and his generosity with Consti-
tutional rights would insure such protection for aliens.21
Judge Anderson, concurring in the result, would not have based
the decision upon such broad grounds:
[T]his court need not hold that the Bill of Rights has extra-
territorial application for foreign nationals. Defendant could
show that he was carried into this jurisdiction in violation of
the Fourth Amendment, but the Government need not com-
ply with the Fourth Amendment or the United States wiretap
laws in foreign jurisdictions. To hold otherwise would be
novel and would make unreasonable demands on our foreign
agents, who by following the laws of the country in which
they are staying could at the same time find themselves in
defiance of United States constitutional safeguards.22
The court could have easily achieved the same result without an
express holding that aliens are protected by the Constitution simply by
refusing to take jurisdiction when (1) the actions of the American
agents violate the laws of the country where the accused is appre-
hended, or (2) by declaring the Federal court system will not be de-
meaned by exercising jurisdiction when sufficiently improper conduct
by American agents is involved. The majority, however, appeared to
derive moral support for its reasoning from the dissenting opinion of
19. 184 F.2d 131, 138 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 939 (1950).
20. 500 F.2d at 280.
21. The opinion is silent as to the possible ramifications of such a holding. For
example, do the constitutional guarantees only attach when the alien is the object of an
investigation by federal agents and do they disappear when the investigation is dropped?
Would an alien later have a cause of action against federal agents for violating his con-
stitutional rights?
22. ld. at 281.
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